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Abstract
Background: Game theory and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game in particular, which captures the paradox of cooperative
interactions that lead to benefits but entail costs to the interacting individuals, have constituted a powerful tool in the study
of the mechanisms of reciprocity. However, in non-human animals most tests of reciprocity in PD games have resulted in
sustained defection strategies. As a consequence, it has been suggested that under such stringent conditions as the PD
game humans alone have evolved the necessary cognitive abilities to engage in reciprocity, namely, numerical
discrimination, memory and control of temporal discounting.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We use an iterated PD game to test rats (Rattus norvegicus) for the presence of such
cognitive abilities by manipulating the strategy of the opponent, Tit-for-Tat and Pseudo-Random, or the relative size of the
temptation to defect. We found that rats shape their behaviour according to the opponent’s strategy and the relative
outcome resulting from cooperative or defective moves. Finally, we show that the behaviour of rats is contingent upon their
motivational state (hungry versus sated).
Conclusions/Significance: Here we show that rats understand the payoff matrix of the PD game and the strategy of the
opponent. Importantly, our findings reveal that rats possess the necessary cognitive capacities for reciprocity-based
cooperation to emerge in the context of a prisoner’s dilemma. Finally, the validation of the rat as a model to study
reciprocity-based cooperation during the PD game opens new avenues of research in experimental neuroscience.
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Introduction
A central feature of the human species is its seemingly
evolutionarily unprecedented capacity to establish cooperative
interactions between non-related individuals. However, many
examples describing similar behaviours in other animals revealed
that this capacity is not exclusive to our species [1], questioning a
simple Darwinian competition scenario for the evolution of
cooperation. Over the last decades, several models have been
put forward to solve this adaptive paradox such as kin selection,
mutualism and reciprocity [2–5]. Nevertheless, when tested in
natural populations and in laboratory conditions, some types of
cooperation have been difficult to validate. In particular, evidence
for reciprocity has not been free from controversy despite the
abundance of reported cases including vampire bats [6], tree
swallows [7], sticklebacks [8], impala [9], blue jays [10], cotton-top
tamarin monkeys [11], red-winged blackbirds [12] and pied
flycatchers [13].
Several mechanistic causes for the emergence of reciprocity-
based cooperation, during the interaction between two individuals,
have been put forward. One of these emphasizes pro-social
propensity of the interacting individuals, in that a cooperative act
constitutes a truly altruistic behaviour emerging from a reward
value attributed to the perception of benefit to others [14].
Alternatively, from a strictly economic perspective, it is proposed
that animals cooperate whenever it entails a benefit, either
immediate or in the future, regardless of the consequence of its
action to the other interacting individual [15]. These two
apparently opposing views may both explain to some degree the
emergence of cooperation. Indeed, cooperation in humans is
sensitive to both pro-social and economic factors [16,17].
Game Theory has proven to be instrumental in the study of
social behaviour, as it formalizes mathematically the outcomes
associated with the decisions of two or more interacting
individuals, framing in economic terms the conditions for
reciprocity [17,18]. In the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), the most
studied game, cooperation leads to benefits but entails costs to the
interacting individuals [19–21]. In the PD game, players can either
cooperate or defect. If both cooperate they receive a higher payoff
(Reward, R) than if they both defect (Punishment, P), but if one
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highest payoff (Temptation, T) whereas the cooperating individual
receives the lowest (Sucker, S). The resulting payoff matrix follows
the rule T.R.P.S. If the game is played only once the best
strategy is defection, however cooperation can be stable if PD is
played repeatedly (iterated PD). Several strategies have proven to
lead to stable cooperation in the iPD game, of which Tit-for-Tat,
the winning strategy in the now classical Axelrod’s iPD
tournament [18,19], has been extremely successful. In this
reciprocating strategy players start by cooperating and subse-
quently repeat the choice of the opponent on the previous game
iteration.
The success of reciprocating strategies in theoretical models of
iPD games has been corroborated experimentally by numerous
reports on the emergence of reciprocal cooperation between
human subjects while playing iPD games [22–24]. However, there
are few reports of cooperation between non-human animals in an
iPD game. It has been shown that corvids can cooperate in an iPD
game if previously trained to cooperate under a mutualistic matrix,
where mutual cooperation yields the highest payoff at no cost [10].
Furthermore, this maintenance of cooperation, after the switch to
a prisoner’s dilemma matrix (but see [25]), was only possible
through the elimination of the effect of temporal discounting, i.e.,
the decrease in incentive value as the time to receive the future
reward increases [21]. Importantly, this set of conditions that
enabled cooperation in the iPD game constituted a significant
deviation from the conditions in natural populations in which
reciprocity might take place. First, it is unlikely that reciprocity
between interacting animals is established after previous mutual-
istic interactions between the same individuals. Second, reciprocity
is based on cooperative action that will be reciprocated by the
other individual in a future interaction, this by definition involves
temporal discounting. Indeed, in non-human animals, experimen-
tal evidence for the use of reciprocating strategies has fallen short
of expectations as most tests have resulted in sustained defection
strategies [26–28]. As a consequence, it has been suggested that
non-human animals may have not evolved the necessary cognitive
abilities to engage in reciprocity, namely numerical discrimination,
memory and control of temporal discounting [21,29].
Recently, it has been shown that rats can display generalized
reciprocity [30] and the probability of a cooperative action is
highest when it constitutes a reciprocating act toward a previously
cooperative individual, direct reciprocity [31]. The remarkable
finding that rats can be reciprocating animals, even though in the
reported task there was no cost in cooperating nor temptation to
defect, led us to re-visit the interactions between two rats during an
iPD game where both cost and temptation are present.
Results
Emergence of Cooperation in an iPD Game under an
Imposed TFT Strategy
Our iPD game was played in a double T-maze in which
choosing between arms was arbitrarily defined as cooperation (C)
or defection (D). The payoff matrix was composed of both rewards
and punishments, where T and R trials led to the delivery of food
pellets and P and S trials led to the delivery of tail pinches
(Table 1). After verifying that rats can discriminate between the
different outcomes of our game matrix, we asked whether
cooperation may emerge and be sustained during an iPD game
when one of the players uses a reciprocating strategy, namely
TFT. To this end, we fixed the strategy of one of the rats (the
stooge), by placing it in the cooperation (C) or defection (D)
compartment of the box (see Materials and Methods), as follows:
on the first trial the stooge rat was placed in C, and for the
remaining trials it was place in C or D according to the TFT rule.
As expected, during the first game session, there was no significant
cooperation. However, from the second session onwards, signif-
icant cooperation levels emerged (Figure 1a). The average rate of
cooperation in the second session reached 0.63 (60.01), and was
maintained until the end of the game (average cooperation across
sessions where behaviour was stable, 5 through 10, see methods,
0.5860.01, n=5). Strikingly, very similar cooperation rates have
been found in human subjects when playing against a TFT
opponent [22,32].
In this game, the frequency of mutual cooperation was
significantly higher than that of mutual defection (reward, R,
and punishment, P, trials, respectively). However, a sizable
incidence of temptation (T) and sucker (S) trials was observed
(Friedman’s ANOVA testing for effect of outcome, Q(3)=53.485,
two-tailed P,0.0001). Also, punishment was lower than all other
outcomes (Figure 1b). This pattern results from the fact that after a
defective move the probability of cooperating was high, and after a
cooperative move the probability of cooperating was the same as
that of defecting (probability of cooperating after defection:
p(C0|P21)=0.84 and p(C0|T21)=0.73; probability of cooperat-
ing after cooperation: p(C0|R21)=0.42 and p(C0|S21)=0.49,
Figure 1c). That is, the probability of repeating a defection move
was very low, leading to infrequent punishment outcomes. In
contrast, the probability of repeating a cooperative move was not
different from chance. That is, after cooperating in a given trial,
staying in mutual cooperation or defecting to obtain the
temptation payoff in the next trial was equally likely. In summary,
rats cooperated more often than they defected. Once rats defected
they quickly reverted to cooperation, avoiding being stuck in
mutual defection cycles (Figure 1d). In addition, after an initial
learning period, the strategy adopted by the different rats was
remarkably similar (see Figure 1c and Figure S1 for individual
performances). In conclusion, rats when playing against a
reciprocating opponent will display a behaviour that is composed
of both mutual cooperation (reward trials) and alternating
reciprocity (alternating temptation and sucker trials).
Rats Adapt Their Behaviour to the Strategy of the
Opponent
If the emergence of cooperation between two interacting
individuals is contingent upon the adoption of a reciprocating
behaviour by at least one of them, then, if the stooge rat uses a
non-reciprocating strategy, cooperation rates should decrease. To
test this hypothesis we fixed the stooge rat in a pseudo-random
strategy, so that the choices of the target rat would not influence
subsequent moves of the stooge. During any given session the
pseudo-random stooge rat cooperates on average 50% of the trials.
The sequence of defective and cooperative moves was random-
Table 1. Prisoner’s Dilemma Payoff Matrix.
Stooge Cooperates Stooge Defects
Target Cooperates R=4 pellets S=3 tail pinches
Target Defects T=6 pellets P=1 tail pinch
The table shows the choices of the two players (cooperate or defect) and the
resulting payoffs (with the exception of experiments shown in Figure 3 and
Figure S2 top panel). The payoffs shown result from cooperation or defection
choices by the target rat (horizontal rows), when the stooge rat (columns) either
cooperates or defects. R- reward, T- temptation, P- punishment, S- sucker.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008483.t001
Prisoner’s Dilemma in Rats
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 January 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 1 | e8483Figure 1. Rats adapt their behaviour to the strategy of the opponent. Sated rats playing under a matrix T=6, R=4, P=21, S=23 against a
Tit-for-Tat (TFT) opponent (a–d) or a pseudo-random (PR) opponent (e–h). (a,e) Line graph showing the cooperation rate of each rat throughout the
game sessions. (b,f) Bar graph shows incidence rate of all outcomes when cooperation reaches stability (mean6s.e.m.; see Materials and Methods).
For each outcome, the moves of the target (underlined) and of the stooge rat are indicated in the graph legend. Asterisks denote significant
difference between means (Multiple pairwise comparisons, using Nemenyi’s Procedure, two tailed, Bonferroni corrected, P,0.0083). (c,g) Line graph
showing probability of cooperation (at trial, t=0) after x outcome (at trial, t=21), P(C0|X21), where X=T, R, P or S. Black lines represent P(C0|X21), for
each target rat, the dark blue line represents the mean P(C0|X21) and the light blue band shows the s.e.m. (d,h) diagram showing the probability of
transition between outcomes. Arrows represent transitions: driven by cooperation in blue, and driven by defection in red (arrow thickness
proportional to transition probability). Asterisks denote significant difference from chance P,0.0083 (see Materials and Methods). T, temptation; R,
reward; P, punishment; S, Sucker; C, cooperation; D, defection.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008483.g001
Prisoner’s Dilemma in Rats
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moves were allowed.
When playing against a random opponent, as in a single-shot
game, the best strategy is to defect. Indeed, we found that against a
pseudo-random strategy, the rat will predominantly defect
(average cooperation rate across sessions 5 to 10, 0.2060.02,
n=5). Cooperation in this game was low irrespective of the
outcome of the previous trial (Figure 1e and f), resulting in low
rates of both reward and sucker trials, and high incidence of
temptation and punishment trials (Friedman’s ANOVA testing for
effect of outcome, Q(3)=77.915, two-tailed P,0.0001.Figure 1g).
This observation is a reflection of the global defection strategy
adopted by these animals (see Figure S2 for individual perfor-
mances). Furthermore, these data reinforce the conclusions from
the previous experiment (Figure 1a–d), in that they show that rats
can cooperate in an iPD game and that their behaviour depends
on the strategy adopted by the opponent. Thus, in our set-up,
reciprocation is necessary for the emergence and sustainability of
cooperation.
Results from these experiments (TFT and PR games) show that
rats display consistent differences in their behaviour depending on
the opponent’s strategy. Nonetheless, in both cases rats are
suboptimal, i.e. the behaviour they adopt does not yield the best
possible outcome. If optimal, when playing against TFT, rats
should always cooperate [18,19], which would yield the highest
number of rewards and no punishments (observed cooperation
rate was ,60%). In contrast, when Playing against PR, rats should
always defect [18,19], again maximizing reward and minimizing
punishment (observed defection rate was ,80%). A common
observation in two alternative choice paradigms is that animals do
not adopt an optimal strategy, following, instead, strategies such as
the matching rule [33]. Matching behaviour is typically observed
when animals face choices associated with different reward
probabilities, in which case animals match their choice rate to
the reward rate at each choice (e.g., they chose 80% of the time
the action that has 0.8 probability of being rewarded) [34].
Nevertheless, the behaviour of rats in the iPD game cannot be
explained by a simple matching rule [34], in which the probability
of cooperating or defecting depends on the relative magnitude of
the payoff obtained from either choice. Indeed, we found that the
only instance in which the choice between cooperation and
defection conforms to the matching rule corresponds to the choice
between positive payoffs (i.e. after a reward trial, R, or a sucker
trial, S) during the TFT game (Figure 1a–d). This rule does not
apply either for choices between negative outcomes (i.e. after a
temptation trial, T, or a punishment trial, P), nor to the game
where the stooge is playing a pseudo-random strategy, where on
each trial the rat’s choice may lead to one of four possible
outcomes, both positive and negative (see Figure S3).
Although the observed behaviour is suboptimal, and does not seem
to conformto the matching ruleit is clearlysensitive to the opponent’s
strategy, thus raising the question of whether the difference in the
behaviour adopted by the rats is truly adjusted to the opponents’
strategy. This question can only be addressed through game
simulations where the behaviour adopted by the rats (observed
behaviour) can be played out against different strategies, e.g. TFT
and pseudo-random. To this end, we used the observed strategies of
rats playing against TFT or PR (Figures 2d and 2h, respectively), to
model games where these same strategies (which we call TFT-based
and PR-based)were played againstpureTFT or Random opponents.
Figure 2. Rats adjust their strategy to the behaviour of the opponent. Simulated games using TFT and PR were performed using the
empirically determined cooperation probabilities after each outcome, T, R, P and S, of the game (see Figure 1d and h). (left panel) Bar graph
showing average outcome, rewards and punishments, per session (sum of 20 trials) of the experimental TFT game and, TFT-based simulation against
TFT and Random. (right panel) Bar graph showing average outcome, rewards and punishments, per session (sum of 20 trials) of the experimental PR
game and, PR-based simulation against TFT and Random. Dashed lines represent the theoretically predicted optimal values for a 20-trial session when
the opponent is playing TFT (panel a) and Random (panel b).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008483.g002
Prisoner’s Dilemma in Rats
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 January 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 1 | e8483Next, we compared the outcome, in rewards and punishments, of the
real games (observed behaviours in the TFT and PR games), with the
game between TFT-based or PR-based (simulation base on observed
behaviour) playing against pure TFT or random opponents. We
found no difference between simulated TFT-based against TFT and
the real TFT game, validating our simulation (unpaired two-tailed t-
tests, Bonferroni corrected, showed, p.0.01) and that the simulated
TFT-based rats did better when playing against a TFT than against a
Random opponent (unpaired two-tailed t-tests, Bonferroni corrected,
show significant difference for rewards p,0.0001, and no difference
for punishments, p.0.01, Figure 2). Conversely, the simulated PR-
based rats did better when playing against a Random than against a
TFT opponent (unpaired two-tailed t-tests, Bonferroni corrected, for
rewards p,0.0001 and for punishments p,0.01), whereas no
difference between the simulated and the real game was found
(p.0.01, Figure 2). Thus, although suboptimal, the strategy adopted
by rats in our experiments was adjusted to the opponent’s behaviour.
Furthermore, we found that rats were closer to optimality when
playing against PR than against TFT. This result may be explained
by the fact that under a PR strategy the game is equivalent to
successive single-shot games, whereas under TFT it is equivalent to
an iterated game, where the outcome of a game iteration depends on
the previous one. Therefore, playing the PD game under a PR
strategy may pose a simpler problem to the players.
Rats Adapt Their Behaviour to the Economic Terms of the
Payoff Matrix
In an iPD game, the highest immediate payoff results from a
temptation trial. However, the highest gain along all sessions is
achieved when both players always cooperate (resulting in 4 food
pellets every trial). Thus, when playing against a TFT opponent
and in full knowledge of the opponent’s current move the target
player should always cooperate. However, if the temptation to
defect is high, subjects will eventually defect. As previously seen,
when playing against TFT, rats in our iPD game cooperate more
often than they defect, but show high incidence of temptation trials
which are immediately followed by cooperation. One possibility is
that rats adopted a mixed strategy (mutual cooperation and
alternating reciprocity) because, even though the temptation to
defect is significant, mutual cooperation entails a higher payoff
than pure alternating reciprocity. If this is true, then decreasing the
outcome of a reward trial (from 4 to 2 food pellets) while
maintaining the level of temptation (6 pellets), should maintain the
levels of alternation between T and S trials, while decrease the
levels of mutual cooperation (R trials). As predicted, we found that
rats showed similar T and S levels as in the first experiment (where
R=4 and T=6), whereas the incidence of mutual cooperation
was significantly lower than that of mutual defection (Friedman’s
ANOVA testing for effect of outcome, Q(3)=66.630, two-tailed
P,0.0001, n=6. See Figure 3b and Figure S2 for individual
performances). Resulting from a low incidence of mutual
cooperation the cooperation rate in this game as low (average
cooperation rate across sessions 5 to 10, 0.3460.02, n=6)
(Figure 3a). This shows that the economic terms of the iPD game
are perceived by the rat and shape its adopted strategy indicating
that rats are capable of numerical discrimination. In addition,
these data suggest that rats are capable of discriminating between
matrices where 2R.T+S (Figure 1) versus 2R,T+S (Figure 3).
Furthermore, together with the previous experiments (see above),
these data strongly suggest that rats remember the past history of
Figure 3. Rats shape their strategy according to economic terms of the game. (a) Line graph showing the cooperation rate of each rat
throughout the game sessions. (b) Bar graphs show incidence rate of all outcomes when cooperation reaches stability. (c) Line graph showing
probability of cooperation after each outcome (d) Diagram showing the probability of transition between outcomes. All graphs and diagrams and
notations as in Figure 1. Asterisks denote significant difference from chance P,0.0083 (see Materials and Methods).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008483.g003
Prisoner’s Dilemma in Rats
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emerged in the following conditions: 1) the opponent played TFT
(which relies on the moves of the previous trial); 2) when the payoff
for mutual cooperation was higher than alternating reciprocity,
which only impacts payoffs accumulated over two or more trials.
This result strengthens the previous finding that rats are capable of
direct reciprocity which requires memory of previous interactions
[29]. Altogether, our results show that rats have the cognitive
capacity to engage in a reciprocating strategy.
Rats’ Behaviour Is Contingent upon Their Motivational
State
Several explanations for the lack of cooperation in previous
studies have been put forward such as high impulsiveness of non-
human animals [35]. Indeed, it has been demonstrated experi-
mentally that impulsiveness and temporal-discounting do play a
role in the animals’ cooperation rate [21,35,36]. Importantly, in all
these studies animals were moderately food deprived. In rats, food
deprivation can alter impulsiveness and incentive value of food
rewards [37]. In our experiments rats had free access to food, and
thus were sated, which could explain our success in observing
cooperation contrasting with previous findings. To test this
possibility we changed the motivational state of the rats, through
moderate food deprivation. As predicted, when food deprived, rats
playing an iPD game against TFT failed to sustain high levels of
cooperation (average cooperation rate across sessions 5 to 10,
0.3560.03, n=6) (Figure 4a and c). Indeed the incidence of
cooperative trials, R and S, was lower than that of defective trials
(Friedman’s ANOVA testing for effect of outcome, Q(3)=43.135,
two-tailed P,0.0001, Figure 4b and Figure S2 for individual
performances). This highlights the central role for motivational
state in decision-making and its consequences in the behavioural
outcome of two interacting individuals.
Discussion
We show that for rats playing an iPD game, the cooperation
rate is modulated by the strategy of the opponent; the relative size
of the reward resulting from cooperation and defection; and the
motivational state of the animals (Kruskal-Wallis testing for effect
of game, K=85.452, P,0.0001, Figure 5). Taken together these
results show that rats possess cognitive capacities necessary for the
control of impulsivity, numerical discrimination and memory,
compatible with the adoption of behaviours, including coopera-
tion, that conform to game theory predictions. Furthermore, we
show that engaging in cooperation can be modulated by the
motivational state of the animal revealing that environmental
factors may impinge on the perception of the strict economic
outcome of social interactions. In addition, this behaviour may be
modulated by social interactions, as it is possible that the rats were
using the opponent as a cue. Indeed, it has been shown that
humans modulate their propensity to cooperate depending on the
identity of the opponent (e.g, computer vs other human) [24]. Also,
in our iPD game choices were sequential raising the question of
whether cooperation would have emerged and be maintained in a
simultaneous choice game. Further work is needed to specifically
address the importance of such factors in establishing reciprocity-
based interactions between rats.
Figure 4. Rats shape their strategy according to their motivational state. (a) Line graph showing the cooperation rate of each rat
throughout the game sessions. (b) Bar graphs show incidence rate of all outcomes when cooperation reaches stability. (c) Line graph showing
probability of cooperation after each outcome (d) Diagram showing the probability of transition between outcomes. All graphs and diagrams and
notations as in Figure 1. Asterisks denote significant difference from chance P,0.0083 (see Materials and Methods).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008483.g004
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capable of complex computations [38–40] and imply that the
evolutionary origin of the cognitive basis for reciprocity is rooted
deeply in the phylogeny of mammals. Finally, our findings may
widen the scope for future studies of decision-making mechanisms
in the context of social interactions [41,42] using the rat model
system.
Materials and Methods
1. Ethics Statement
The Instituto Gulbenkian de Cie ˆncia follows the Portuguese
Guidelines, which comply with the European Directive 86/609/
EEC of the European Council.
2. Subjects
The experiments were performed using male non-litter mates of
the outbred Sprague Dawley rat strain, from Charles River,
Barcelona, Spain. All animals were housed in pairs under 12 h
light/dark cycle. Experiments were conducted during the light
period. Before starting the experiment, all rats were habituated for
one week to the experimenter and to the novel food used for the
positive reinforcements in the iPD game. Each experiment used
naive rats and all rats within a game played against the same
stooge. In each game 5 to 6 target rats were used (see
corresponding Figures for sample size). For the experiments using
sated rats, subjects had free access to food and water, whereas, for
the experiments using food-deprived rats, animals had restricted
access to food and kept at 85% of their ad libitum weight.
3. Apparatus
The apparatus consists of a double T-maze made of plexiglass
(Figure 6). Each T-maze consisted of a small start box that gave
access, through a sliding door, to two compartments (Figure 6).
The two compartments of each T-maze were separated by a
movable partitioning wall. The sidewalls of each T-maze were
black. The walls adjacent to the opposing T-Maze, and the
partitioning wall between compartments within the maze were
transparent and perforated, so that rats could see and smell each
other from all locations in the maze.
4. Payoff Matrix
We used a Prisoner’s Dilemma game matrix, in which
T.R.P.S. Preliminary evidence showed that, as predicted by
Stevens and Clements [43], heterogeneous matrices (with both
positive, R and T, and negative, P and S, outcomes) lead to higher
cooperation rates as compared to homogeneous, all-reward,
matrices (data not shown). Therefore, we used a payoff matrix
composed of both rewards and punishments, where temptation
and reward trials led to the delivery of food pellets (Bio-Serv 45 mg
precision food pellets) and punishment and sucker trials led to the
delivery of tail pinches (forceps were used to deliver tail pinches
close to the tip of the rats’ tail). Table 1 shows the payoff matrix
used in our game.
We first verified that rats can discriminate the difference
between temptation and reward outcomes (6 vs. 4 food pellets
respectively), and between punishment and sucker outcomes (1 vs.
3 tail pinches respectively). In these experiments only one T-Maze
was used and simple preference tests were performed. Rats were
placed in the start box and given a choice between the two
compartments of the T-maze. For the positive reinforcement test,
6 pellets (T outcome) were delivered in one compartment and 4
pellets (R outcome) in the other (high and low rewards were
delivered in a counterbalanced fashion in the left and right
compartment). We found that over 5 days with one session of 20
trials, preference for the 6-pellet compartment steadily increased
reaching 8462% by the last day. G-test shows that choice of high
reward was significantly different from chance, GP=61.50,
P=4.4610
215 (see Materials and Methods, section 6.3). For the
negative reinforcement test a similar experiment was performed,
where 1 tail pinch was delivered in one compartment and 3 tail
Figure 5. Cooperation levels vary with the different iPD games.
Left panel shows time-course of cooperation rate along the ten game
sessions for each iPD game (mean6s.e.m.). Each line represents one of
the games tested. Right panel shows proportion of cooperation in each
iPD game (mean6s.e.m.) when cooperation reaches stability (see
methods). Each bar represents one game (same colour as in line graph).
Asterisk, denote significant difference between means (Multiple
pairwise comparisons, using Dunn’s Procedure, two tailed Bonferroni
corrected, P,0.0083).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008483.g005
Figure 6. T-maze diagram. Diagram of the double T-maze used in
the presented experiments. One T-maze is represented in grey with its
respective start box and two choice compartments. In dashed lines is
shown the identical opposing T-maze. Arrows show the movement
direction of the start box door and of the partition between
compartments.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008483.g006
Prisoner’s Dilemma in Rats
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compartment emerged in the second half of the first session and
remained stable around 60% for the remaining training sessions
(on the last session average choice of 1 tail pinch was 5963%,
significantly different from chance, GP=4.06, P=0.04). These
results show that rats could discriminate 6 over 4 food pellets, and
1 over 3 tail pinches.
5. iPD Game
All iPD games were played for 10 consecutive days consisting of
one daily session, of 20 trials each. The two compartments of each
T-Maze were arbitrarily defined as cooperation (C) or defection
(D) compartments (counterbalanced across rats). Thus, in our iPD
game a cooperating or defecting act was defined as entering the C
or D compartment respectively. For consecutive target rats
cooperation or defection was ascribed to opposing compartments.
This experimental design guarantees that odour cues from the
previous target rat would elicit the opposite response (cooperate or
defect) from the following target rat. For each game one of the rats,
the stooge, was assigned to play a fixed strategy, either Tit-For-Tat
or Pseudo-Random, and the other rat (the target) could freely
choose between C and D. A new stooge was used for each game
but it was the same for all rats within a game. On each trial of the
game, the stooge was placed in C or D (according to the a priori
defined strategy), after which the target rat was placed in the start
box of the adjacent T-maze and was allowed to go for D or C (free
choice). Given that the partition wall between mazes was
transparent and perforated, the target rat can use the placement
of the stooge as a cue to guide its choice. Once the decision was
made, i.e. when all four paws were inside one of the
compartments, the experimenter closed the partition and delivered
the reinforcement, according to the payoff matrix of the game. If
the target rat did not choose a compartment within 30 seconds of
the beginning of the trial, the experimenter slowly closed the
partition prompting the rats to choose one of the two
compartments. The target rat was then removed from the T-
maze and a new trial started with next target rat. For each target
rat the average inter-trial interval was 4–5 minutes (corresponding
to the amount of time it took to run all rats, typically 4 were run on
any given session). Before the first session of the game, rats were
exposed to the T-maze (habituation phase), three days without the
stooge in the adjacent T-maze and five days with the stooge in the
adjacent T-maze (5 min/day).
6. Statistical Analysis
All statistical analysis, except for the G-tests (which were
calculated manually using Excel from Microsoft Office, see
paragraph III), where performed using XSTAT, from Microsoft.
Since the data analyzed did not follow normal distributions (as
shown by Shapiro-Wilk normality tests) non-parametric statistical
tests were used for analysis II, III and IV.
6.1–Stability of cooperation. In order to analyse the
strategy adopted by the rats in the different games, we pooled
the data from the sessions in which cooperation rates were stable.
To identify when the cooperation rate stabilized, for each game we
plotted the cooperation rate for all rats across sessions (note that no
animal was excluded from the analysis). Next we fitted several
linear models to the data, where the first model included all
sessions, and in the successive models the data included would
slide by one session (model 1 included sessions 1 through 10;
model 2 included sessions 2 through 10 and so on). We found that
for all games from session 5 onwards the slope of the linear fit was
not different from zero. Thus, for all analysis of the rats’
performance the data was pooled from sessions 5 through 10.
6.2–Rate of incidence of the different outcomes, T, R, P
and S. To compare mean rate of the different outcomes, for
each game we first performed a Friedman’s ANOVA (with
outcome as single within subject factor). When significant,
a=0.05, multiple post-hoc pairwise comparisons using the
Nemenyi’s procedure/Two-tailed tests were performed, with the
Bonferroni corrected a value of 0.0083.
6.3–Probability of cooperation after each outcome. To
test whether the probability of cooperation after each outcome was
different from chance, i.e. 0.5, we performed G-tests. We
calculated the parameter GP to test for deviations from the
theoretical distribution [44]. Bonferroni corrected significance
value corresponds to a=0.01.
6.4–Cooperation rate in the different games. To compare
the mean cooperation rate observed in the different games a
Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA was performed using game as a single
between-subject factor. Multiple post-hoc pairwise comparisons
using the Dunn’s procedure/Two-tailed test were performed, with
the Bonferroni corrected a value of 0.0083.
7. Simulation of Games Based on the Observed
Behaviour
In order to assess whether the behaviour adopted by rats when
playing against TFT (observed behaviour) would yield a worse
outcome if the same strategy would be adopted against a Random
opponent, we simulated games where the observed strategy was
played against TFT (modelling the real game) or against a random
opponent. To model the observed behaviour we used the
probability of cooperation after each of the game’s outcomes
(T,R,P,S), averaged across the five rats that played TFT
(P(C0|T21)=0.73, P(C0|R21)=0.42 P(C0|P21)=0.84,
P(C0|S21)=0.49). This model (consisting of the above coopera-
tion probabilities) corresponds to the simulated TFT-based player.
Using this model we simulated a game where the opponent was
playing either pure TFT or pure Random. The simulation was run
5 times for each opponent. First, to validate our model, the
average outcome for the simulated game against TFT was
compared to the average outcome obtained by rats playing the
real game (observed outcome). Next, the outcome of the simulated
game against TFT was compared to that against Random.
The same procedure was used to model the observed behaviour
when rats played against a pseudo-randomstooge rat, so thatwecould
assesswhetherthe behaviour adopted byratswhen playing against PR
(observed behaviour) would yield a worse outcome if the same strategy
would be adopted against a TFT opponent. For the simulated PR-
based player we used the following probabilities: p(C0|T21)=0.22,
p(C0|R21)=0.24 p(C0|P21)=0.19, p(C0|S21)=0.07 (average prob-
abilities across the five rats that played against PR). Note that in the
real game the stooge rat was playing a pseudo-random strategy, in
such way that there was never more than 4 times the same move (C or
D), whereas the virtual rat played a pure random strategy.
The simulations were run in Excel from Microsoft Office.
Comparisons of the outcome from the different simulated games
unpaired, two-tailed T-tests were performed, with the Bonferroni
corrected a value of 0.01.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Diagram showing the probability of transition
between outcomes of individual rats. Arrows represent transitions:
driven by cooperation in blue, and driven by defection in red
(arrow thickness proportional to transition probability). In all
panels: T, temptation; R, reward; P, punishment; S, Sucker; C,
cooperation; D, defection.
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Figure S2 Diagram showing the probability of transition
between outcomes of individual rats. Subjects shape their strategy
according to the iPD game conditions (each game differs from
game 1 for the highlighted condition). Arrows represent
transitions: driven by cooperation in blue, and driven by defection
in red (arrow thickness proportional to transition probability). In
all panels: T, temptation; R, reward; P, punishment; S, Sucker; C,
cooperation; D, defection.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008483.s002 (0.12 MB TIF)
Figure S3 Comparison between observed behaviour and
matching behaviour. The figure shows the observed probability
of cooperation after each outcome, Reward, Sucker, Punishment
and Temptation, black bars (mean6s.e.m), together with the
expected probability of cooperation if rats would be matching for
reward (p(C0|R-1) and p(C0|S-1)) or punishment (p(C0|P-1) and
p(C0|T-1)) magnitudes, white bars. The observed behaviour
approached that of matching only for the game in a), when rats
were choosing between 6 or 4 food pellets, i.e., after a reward or
sucker trial. Note that this analysis is not possible for the game
where rats were playing against a pseudo-random stooge, because
all transitions between outcomes were possible, and thus, rats had
to choose between rewards or punishments of different magni-
tudes, but also between rewards and punishment (in this case
outcomes are not comparable, therefore matching does not apply).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008483.s003 (0.08 MB TIF)
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